2016年政治民粹主义的兴起促使宏观经济学家们反思应该如何对待导致这股新政治浪潮的基本原因——通常认为是全球化和技术。
The rise in political populism in 2016 has forced macro-economists profoundly to re-assess their attitude towards the basic causes of the new politics, which are usually identified to be globalisation and technology.
对这些重大问题（尤其是全球化）合适政策回应的共识似乎正在发生极大变化，而且正如加文.克利(Gavin Kelly)很有说服力地辩称的那样，或许早该如此。
The consensus on the appropriate policy response to these major issues – particularly the former – seems to be changing dramatically and, as Gavin Kelly persuasively argues, probably not before time.
除非经济学家们能够对这些革命性变化找出理性回应方式，否则政界就会失去耐心，让问题完全失控，结果可能是灾难性的。
Unless economists can develop a rational response to these revolutionary changes, political impatience will take matters completely out of their hands, and the outcome could be catastrophic.
遗憾的是，尽管问题的本质日渐清晰，但要找出经济上合理、政治上也可行的解决方案，从根本上来说依然是不成熟的（见丹尼.莱比锡(Danny Leipziger)）。
Unfortunately, while the nature of the problem is coming into sharper focus, the nature of a solution that makes economic sense while also being politically feasible remains embryonic at best (see Danny Leipziger).
不久以前，经济学家对全球化的主流态度还是直接明了的。
Until very recently, the mainstream attitude of economists towards globalisation was straightforward.
他们坚信自由贸易可以提高生产率和整体经济福祉，无论是在发达经济体还是在新兴经济体。
Free trade was overwhelmingly believed to increase productivity and overall economic welfare, both in developed economies and emerging economies.
因此，人们认为，应该尽快废除贸易和国际资本流动壁垒，无论它们存在于哪里。
Therefore, it was argued that barriers to trade and international capital movements should be reduced as rapidly as possible, wherever they existed.
尽管人们认识到，发达世界中可能会有自由贸易的输家，但他们认为这些输家很少，而且是暂时的，相比之下，受益者有许多，而且是永久性的。
While it was recognised that there could be losers from free trade in the developed economies, these losers were thought to be few and temporary, compared to the gainers, who were many and permanent.
2016年的政治动荡促使经济学家们进行反思。
The political upheavals of 2016 have forced economists to reconsider.
如今称做民粹主义的东西的最终形态我们仍未完全清楚。
The final shape of what is now called populism is not yet entirely clear.
它似乎不能轻易归入传统的左右翼或者自由/保守主义范畴。
It does not seem to fit easily on the traditional right/left, or liberal/conservative, spectrum.
这就是很难对这场政治革命的两个最明显受益者——特里萨.梅(Theresa May)和唐纳德.特朗普(Donald Trump)进行归类的原因。
This is why two of the most obvious benefits of the political revolution, Theresa May and Donald Trump, are hard to categorize in this regard [1].
然而，这里的确有一个统一的主题，那就是经济民族主义的复兴，伴随着对国际主义或全球化的支持大幅下降。
There does, however, seem to be one unifying theme and that is a resurgence in economic nationalism, with a collapse in support for internationalism or globalisation.
既然发达经济体的精英们被视为是全球化的主要受益者，那么就会出现反精英主义以及拒绝专家建议。
Since the elites are seen as the main beneficiaries of globalisation in the developed economies, this has gone hand in hand with anti-elitism and a rejection of advice from experts.
后者可能轻易地发展为反理性主义，长期而言这当然是灾难性的。
The latter could easily develop into anti-rationalism, which would surely prove disastrous in the long term.
经济学家已经认识到这些风险，新的共识开始浮现。
Economists have now recognised these dangers, and a new consensus has started to emerge.
自由贸易和全球化整体而言对社会有利，这种绝对信念（几乎）没有任何改变。
There has been (almost) no change in the overwhelming belief that free trade and globalisation are good things for society as a whole.
但现在人们更广泛地接受了一点：与人们以前所以为的相比，这些改变导致的输家数量可能更多、持续时间更长而且在政治上更自信。
But it is now much more widely accepted that the losers from these changes can be more numerous, more long lasting and more politically assertive than previously thought.
新的共识认为，只有输家获得赢家所给予的补偿，全球化的益处才可以得到维护和扩大。
The new consensus holds that the gains from globalisation can only be defended and extended if the losers are compensated by the winners.
否则，一些对全球化过程的政治抵制将会压垮受益者，即便后者依然占多数。
Otherwise, pockets of political resistance to the process of globalisation will begin to overwhelm the gainers, even though the latter remain in the majority [2].
尽管补偿原则似乎足够清晰，但如何补偿要复杂得多。
While the compensation principle seems clear enough, the complexity of actually getting it done is much greater.
正如贾里德.伯恩斯坦(Jared Bernstein)所言，锈带需要帮助，但如何帮助尚不清楚。
As Jared Bernstein says, the rust belt needs help, but it is not clear how to help the rust belt.
同样还不清楚的是，人们是否会形成一种政治或经济共识，支持采取一些有可能采取的最明显举措，至少其力度能够带来可以察觉的改变。
Nor is it at all obvious that there would be a political or economic consensus supporting some of the most obvious measures that could be adopted, at least on the scale that would be needed to make a noticeable difference.
全球化的主要赢家可以分为两类：新兴世界的低技能劳动力以及发达经济体中的较高收入阶层。
The main gainers from globalisation have been twofold: unskilled labour in the emerging world, and those at the upper end of the income scale in the developed economies.
主要输家是发达世界的产业工人（马克.卡尼(Mark Carney)就该话题提出令人信服的证据）。
The main losers have been industrial workers in the developed world.
可想而知，这个问题最直接的解决方案是采取措施扭转收入分配的这些变化，或者是在全球范围内，或者是在发达世界内部。
(See Mark Carney for some compelling evidence on this topic.) The most direct solutions to the problem would presumably be to take measures that would reverse these changes in income distribution, either globally or within the boundaries of the developed world.
这就是为何当选总统特朗普对来自墨西哥和中国的进口商品提出保护主义动议的原因，它们显然是对美国制造业部门最重要的威胁。
This is why President-elect Trump has focused protectionist proposals on imports from Mexico and China, which are clearly the most important threats to the manufacturing sector in the United States.
遗憾的是，对这两个国家的制造业产品征收进口关税可能让生产转移至其他新兴经济体，而不是美国工业地区。
Unfortunately, tariffs on manufactured imports from these two countries are likely to displace production to other emerging economies, not to the industrialized regions of America.
此外，更全面地限制所有制造产品进入美国将会让美国消费者面临价格上涨的局面，导致国内生产中断，因为关键进口部件稀缺，从而加剧本就严重的生产力危机。
Furthermore, a more general restriction on all manufactured imports into the US would raise prices to American consumers, cause disruptions to domestic output as key imported components became scarce, and worsen the productivity crisis that is already serious enough anyway.
它还会导致新兴经济体中的工人们收入减少，按全球标准来看他们仍然工资微薄。
This would also redistribute income away from workers in the emerging world, who are still low paid by global standards.
这种做法在政治上不应获得广泛赞同，但它发生的风险越来越高。
That would not deserve to command general consent in the political process, but there is a rising danger that it could happen anyway.
将收入从那些发达经济体内的受益人（主要是处于收入分配高端区间的人）转移出来、补偿输家怎么样？这种做法可能被视为尊重自然公正原则，因为它将逆转自由贸易导致的收入和财富的横财再分配。
What about compensating the losers by redistributing income away from those who have gained inside the developed economies, mainly at the upper end of the income scale? That approach might be seen to respect the principles of natural justice, since it would reverse the windfall redistribution in income and wealth caused by free trade.
然而，这种类型的一般再分配会遇到的常见困难，这里也不例外。
It does, however, run into very familiar difficulties with a generalized redistribution of this type.
它很难将那些全球化输家和那些碰巧因其他原因（包括自我选择造成的）生活艰难的人区分开。
It would be difficult to distinguish between those who have lost from globalization, and those who have hit upon hard times for other reasons, including the results of their own choices.
它会破坏促使人们冒险和推动扩张的经济激励。
And it would undermine economic incentives to take risk and promote expansion.
这种为失败提供补偿的原则已经通过税收和福利体系进行，而且可以说，它已经提供了过去被社会视为理想的社会保障网。
The principle of compensation for loss already operates through the tax and benefits system, and it could be argued that this already provides the safety net that society has seen as optimal in the past.
与过去其他经济冲击（比如衰退以及对特定类型的生产需求变少）下提供的补偿相比，这种新的失败来源值得提供新的更多补偿吗？
Why does this new source of loss merit a new and larger form of compensation than previously provided against other economic shocks, like recessions and shifts in the composition of demand away from certain types of production?
这个问题的答案是，全球化输家往往集中于特定地区，比如美国锈带地区和英格兰北部。
One answer to this question is that the losers from globalization tend to be concentrated in particular regions, like the American rust belt and Northern England.
那些地区的人尤其难以东山再起。
It is particularly hard for people in these regions to recover.
这将支持地区转移的观点，从美国沿海各州和英国伦敦等更为成功的地区转移给艰难地区。
This would argue for regional transfers, away from more successful regions like the coastal states in America, and London in the UK.
人们在过去尝试了这些想法，并未取得巨大成功，甚至在大规模实施的时候也是如此，比如在柏林墙倒塌之后对东德的转移（见保罗.克鲁格曼(Paul Krugman)）。
These ideas have been tried in the past, without any great success, even when implemented in large scale, such as the transfers made to East Germany after the Berlin Wall came down (see Paul Krugman).
这是让人们知难而退吗？并非如此，但它的确警告了我们今后面临的巨大困难以及给受影响地区制造虚幻希望的危险（特朗普在竞选时完全忽视了这些风险）。
Is this a counsel of despair? No, but it does warn of great difficulties ahead, and of the dangers (entirely ignored by candidate Trump) of raising false hopes in the afflicted regions.
当然现在也有了一些进展。
Some progress is certainly being made.
劳伦斯.萨默斯(Lawrence Summers)呼吁负责任的民族主义。
Lawrence Summers calls for responsible nationalism.
国际货币基金组织(IMF)杰出的首席经济学家莫里斯.奥布斯菲尔德(Maurice Obstfeld)列出了长长的合适政策措施清单，包括为失业者提供再培训项目和地区基础设施支出等等。
Maurice Obstfeld, the outstanding Chief Economist at the IMF, has outlined a long list of appropriate policy measures, including programmes of retraining for the unemployment, regional infrastructure spending, etc.
但是，尽管他呼吁推行帮助人们获得新工作的蹦床政策、而非社保政策，但对奥巴马风格的自由主义者来说，这些干预举措相当熟悉。
But while he calls for trampoline policies that offer a springboard to new jobs, rather than safety net policies, these interventions are rather familiar to Obama-style liberals.
与此同时，美国共和党人和英国保守党人似乎决定走上一条截然不同的路。
Meanwhile the Republicans in the US and the Conservatives in Britain seem to have decided to go down a very different path.
自由主义的经济解决方案尽管对IMF颇具吸引力，但是不适合一群掌权的政客。
Liberal economic solutions, while attractive to the IMF, have the wrong set of politicians in power.
如果我们回想12个月前，那个时候没有人预料到英国会退欧、唐纳德.特朗普会赢得美国大选。
If we cast our minds back 12 months, no one predicted Brexit or Donald Trump’s victory.
政治快速变化，经济需要跟进。
Politics is moving fast, and economics needs to catch up.
如何补偿全球化输家将是2017年宏观层面的大问题。
How to compensate the losers from globalisation will be the big story in macro in 2017.